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Abstract 
Presidential debates are viewed as providing an important public good by 
revealing information on candidates to voters. However, this may not always 
be the case. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in 
which an incumbent and a contender (who is privately informed about her 
own quality) publicly announce whether they are willing to participate in a 
public debate, taking into account that a voter's choice of candidate depends 
on her beliefs regarding the candidates' qualities and on the state of nature. 
We derive conditions under which debates are agreed to and show when they 
are informative and when not. Surprisingly, it is found that in equilibrium a 
debate occurs or does not occur independently of the contender's quality or 
the sequence of the candidates’ announcements to participate and therefore 
the announcements are uninformative.  
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1. Introduction 
In US presidential elections, debates between the candidates are major media 
events. Even the least watched debate had an audience share of about 30 
percent (Erikson and Wlezien, 2014).1 The debates may or may not have a 
significant effect on voters (for evidence of the former view, see Abramowitz, 
1978; Miller and MacKuen, 1979; and Lanoue, 1991; for evidence of the latter 
view, see Geer, 1988). Erikson and Wlezien (2014) point out that although 
there is some available anecdotal evidence regarding presidential debates, 
their effect on voter behavior is hard to measure and therefore remains an 
open question. Furthermore, while in some countries, such as the US, debates 
are regularly held, in others, such as Israel, they are rare.2 In particular, 
candidates are usually not obligated to participate in a debate and they take 
place only if both candidates agree to do so. In light of the aforementioned 
measurement difficulties, it would appear that a theoretical model is required. 
In what follows, we build a game theoretic model that to our knowledge is 
the first to evaluate the mutual effect between candidates and voters in 
presidential debates (although it may also apply in other contexts). We 
essentially attempt to answer two important questions: 1) Under what 
conditions are debates held? and 2) Are they informative or noisy?  
                                                          
1
 The debates held in 2000 and 2004 were the least watched among all debates held prior to 
2012. 
2
 In Israel, head-to-head debates between the two leading candidates for prime minister were 
held regularly only between 1977 and 1996. Even in the US, presidential debates were not 
held between 1964 and 1972. 
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Specifically, we consider a model in which an incumbent and a contender 
(who is privately informed about her own quality) are running for president. 
Before the elections are held, each candidate publicly announces whether she 
is willing to participate in a debate, in which the winner—from the voters’ 
perspective—is stochastically determined according to the candidates’ 
qualities. On Election Day, the (median) voter's choice of whom to vote for 
depends on the candidate’s expected qualities and on nature, which is a 
random variable realized on Election Day.  
We show that the game’s equilibrium is independent of the contender's 
quality. In particular, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in 
which the contender always announces that she is willing to participate in a 
debate, whereas the incumbent's announcement depends on other 
fundamentals in the model. This can be viewed as "the dictatorship of the 
incumbent." Specifically, under reasonable conditions, the incumbent chooses 
to participate in a debate when her quality is low and not to participate when 
her quality is high.  In a sense, these results correspond to what seems to be 
commonly observed, where the contender usually challenges the incumbent 
to confront her in a debate, with the incumbent sometimes accepting the 
challenge and sometimes not. In particular, in countries where presidential 
debates are not regularly held, strong incumbents often choose to avoid such 
debates.  
As a consequence of the candidates’ behavior, their announcements are 
completely uninformative since information on the contender’s quality is not 
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revealed. However, if a debate is held, and depending on the shape of the 
probability distribution of the contender's quality, it can be either informative 
or noisy. Furthermore, the announcements made by the candidates are shown 
to be independent of the sequence in which they are made, and every 
sequence satisfies Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium when it is endogenously 
determined.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In the remainder of this section, we 
review the related literature. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 
presents the results, which in section 4 are generalized to a game in which the 
sequence of announcements is endogenously determined. Section 5 
concludes. 
Literature review    
There are numerous empirical studies that support the common assumption 
that voters update their beliefs about candidates’ attributes on the arrival of 
new information (see, Wantchekon 2003; Gerber et al., 2011; Fujiwara and 
Wantchekon, 2013; Kendall et al., 2015). In particular, Banerjee et al. (2010, 
2011) provide evidence from field experiments carried out in India which 
show that voter decisions are influenced by information available on 
candidate performance and quality. They specifically show that voters 
sophisticatedly use information to evaluate the candidates. We use the same 
assumption.  
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This is also the assumption made in the literature on voter learning 
although those models focus on learning from the outcomes of primaries and 
prior decisions made by other voters (for instance see, Dekel and Piccione, 
2000; Knight and Schiff, 2010; Deltas et al., 2015; Deltas and Polborn, 2019). 
We take a more game-theoretic approach in which the median voter learn 
about the candidates by observing strategic interaction between them (in the 
form of a debate), which includes the possibility of avoiding participation.   
In particular, a presidential debate is modeled here as a contest (see 
Dixit, 1987; Konrad, 2009). However, unlike in standard contest models, we 
assume that the outcome of a debate depends only on player qualities rather 
than their effort. Although participating in a debate certainly requires a 
certain amount of effort, we nevertheless posit that the effort invested and its 
effect on the debate’s outcome are of marginal importance and moreover the 
outcome is primarily determined by the candidates’ inherent abilities.  
Krähmer (2007) and Noe (forthcoming) are perhaps closest to the 
current model. The former examined repeated ex-ante symmetric two-player 
contests, in which the player's choice set of effort is binary. The player’s 
ability, which is also binary, is unknown and she obtains this information by 
observing the outcome of previous contests. Noe (forthcoming) derives 
conditions under which always selecting the larger alternative from two 
random draws from two unconditional distributions insures that the resulting 
selection-conditioned distributions satisfy a natural stochastic ordering. In 
particular, he presents a general framework that can be used to characterize 
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the effects of selection in asymmetric, all-pay auction, effort-bidding contests. 
The model presented here differs from them in that we consider an effortless 
single probabilistic contest with endogenous participation choices and 
asymmetric ex-ante informed players with private information and a 
continuous distribution of abilities, which may affect the choice of the winner 
by a decision maker given her own prior. Therefore, our model can be viewed 
as complementary to the two aforementioned models.3   
2. The Model 
Two candidates, an incumbent and a contender, are running for president. 
The incumbent's quality is commonly known to be 𝑞𝐼(∈ (0, 1]) while the 
contender's quality, q, is a random variable with a probability distribution p 
over the interval [0,∞) with mean 𝑞 > 0. The actual value of q, 𝑞∗(∈ [0,∞)), is 
private information known only to the contender until it is learned by all after 
Election Day.4 Since the incumbent has already served as president while the 
contender has not, we assume that there is more information available on the 
incumbent (which may not necessarily be the case). Furthermore, we restrict qI 
                                                          
3 The current model is also related to Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) who consider two rival 
parties that provide costly information to a voter who chooses between their two policies. It is 
also related to Gentzkow and Kamenica (2015, 2016) who study the effect of competition on 
information in models with ex-ante symmetric information and multiple senders who choose 
what information to reveal to a decision maker. To study presidential debates, however, we 
consider a different environment, in which competition is between two asymmetric players 
with different priors and conflicting interests and who are involved in a strategic interaction 
with binary choices. 
4 To simplify the notation, we use a subscript only to note the incumbent's quality.  
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to be bounded from above in order to assign a positive probability to the case 
in which the contender's quality is higher than that of the incumbent.5  
Before Election Day, each candidate publicly and simultaneously 
announces whether she is willing to participate in a debate (P) or not (NP), 
where the probability of the contender winning the debate is 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼) and that 
of the incumbent is 1 − 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼)), where 𝜃 satisfies the usual properties6: 
(1) 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑞𝐼
< 0,
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑞∗
> 0,
𝜕2𝜃
𝜕𝑞∗2
< 0, 𝜃(0, 𝑞𝐼) = 0 and when 𝑞
∗ → ∞, 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼) →
1 ∀𝑞𝐼 ∈ (0, 1].  
A debate is held only when both candidates announce P.  
2.1 The voter 
There is one voter. In the case that a debate is not held, she observes the 
candidate's announcements before the elections. In the case that a debate is 
held, she observes who won the debate.  
If we define ?̅?𝑒 to be the expected value of q on Election Day, then the 
voter chooses the contender when ?̅?𝑒 − 𝑞𝐼 > 𝜀, where 𝜀(∈ 𝑅), which 
represents nature, is a random variable independent of q with a commonly 
known cumulative distribution G that is realized on Election Day (before the 
voter chooses a candidate). Note that 𝜀 can be viewed as a measure of the 
match—from the voters’ perspective—between the incumbent and the state of 
                                                          
5
 In principal, qI can be bounded from above by any real positive number and the specific 
assumption of a boundary of 1 is made without loss of generality.  
6
 Note that the constraints on 𝜃 with respect to q* are tighter than the constraints on 𝜃 with 
respect to qI. Therefore, we do not require anonymity.  
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nature.7 For instance, if a natural disaster takes place in the time between the 
debate and the elections and the voter has determined the expected quality of 
the contender to be equal to that of the incumbent, then the voter may vote for 
the more experienced candidate (this corresponds to the case in which the 
realization of ε is positive). More generally, a candidate usually has 
characteristics other than quality that may give her an advantage in certain 
scenarios. Note that the voter only cares about the contender’s expected 
quality (not about its distribution) and therefore she is risk-neutral. 
After the announcements are made and the debate is held (or not), and 
before ε is realized, the probability of the contender winning the election is 
therefore 𝐺(?̅?𝑒- 𝑞𝐼).8   
2.2 Timeline 
In view of the above, the timeline of the model is as follows:  
1. Candidates simultaneously choose P or NP.  
2. A debate is held iff both candidates chose P. 
3. ε is realized. 
4. The voter chooses a candidate. 
After announcements are made, the voter follows a decision rule and 
hence is not defined here as a player. We therefore consider a Bayesian game 
with two players (i.e. the incumbent and the contender) who have the same 
                                                          
7
 This voter can be viewed as the "median voter". Then, in any realization of 𝜀 in which 
?̅?𝑒 − 𝑞𝐼 < 𝜀, the majority of voters prefer the incumbent and therefore vote for her. 
8
  See Dixit (1987) for a similar framework of noisy contests. 
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choice set: {𝑃, 𝑁𝑃}, but different information sets. We therefore focus our 
attention on Bayesian equilibria.9  
2.3 Candidates 
Each candidate maximizes her expected probability of winning the elections. 
We assume that a candidate is indifferent between winning with a certain 
probability and winning with an expected probability equal in value. 
Therefore, both the voter and the candidates are risk-neutral. In the remainder 
of this section, we describe each candidate’s problem and add some notation 
that will be useful in the remainder of the analysis. 
The contender Let 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗] be the contender's expected probability of winning 
the elections, after announcements are made and before the debate is held (or 
before Election Day if the debate is not held), from the contender’s 
perspective (who knows her own quality).  
Note that if a debate is held, ?̅?𝑒 is determined following it. Otherwise, ?̅?𝑒 is 
determined right after announcements are made, in which case 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗] ≡
𝐺(?̅?𝑒 − 𝑞𝐼).  
In particular, if only the contender announces NP, let ?̅?𝑒 ≡ 𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃  and if 
only the incumbent announces NP, let ?̅?𝑒 ≡ 𝑞|𝐼𝑁𝑃; if both announce NP, let 
?̅?𝑒 ≡ 𝑞|𝐼𝐶𝑁𝑃 and if both announce P, let 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗] ≡ 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷. 
                                                          
9
 In section 4, we consider a dynamic extension of the model, in which the sequence of 
announcements is endogenously determined. There we consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. 
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Let p(q')│w be the probability that the contender's quality is q' in the case 
that a debate was held and she won, and let p(q')│l be the probability that it is 
q' in the case that a debate was held and she lost, for all 𝑞′ ∈ [0,∞). Also, let 
?̅?𝑒 ≡ 𝑞|𝑤 if the contender won and ?̅?𝑒 ≡ 𝑞|𝑙 if she lost. It then follows that: 
(2) 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 
= 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼)𝐺((𝑞|𝑤) − 𝑞𝐼) + (1 − 𝜃(𝑞
∗, 𝑞𝐼))𝐺((𝑞|𝑙) − 𝑞𝐼). 
Given the incumbent's announcement, the contender makes the 
announcement that maximizes 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]. Formally, given the incumbent's 
announcement, the contender’s maximization problem is: 
(3) max
announcement∈{𝑃,𝑁𝑃}
𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗] . 
The incumbent Let 𝐸𝐺 be the contender's expected probability of winning the 
election, after announcements are made and before the debate is held (or 
before Election Day when the debate is not held), from the incumbent’s 
perspective (since she does not observe the contender ‘s quality).  
In the case that both candidates announce P, let 𝐸𝐺 ≡ 𝐸𝐺|𝐷.10 Otherwise, 
by definition, 𝐸𝐺 ≡ 𝐺(?̅?𝑒 − 𝑞𝐼) ≡ 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗].  
Given the contender's announcement, the incumbent makes the 
announcement that maximizes her expected probability of winning the 
election, i.e., 1 − 𝐸𝐺, which therefore minimizes 𝐸𝐺. Formally, given the 
contender's announcement, the incumbent’s minimization problem is: 
                                                          
10 It is shown later that 𝐸𝐺|𝐷 is identical to (6).  
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(4) min
announcement∈{𝑃,𝑁𝑃}
𝐸𝐺. 
We now proceed to the analysis of the model’s results. 
3. Results 
3.1 Mandatory participation in the debate 
It is useful at this point to consider the case in which participation in the 
debate is mandatory (i.e., neither of the players needs to make a decision).  
We add the lower index m to all notations in this subsection. For instance, 
𝑞|𝑤𝑚 is the contender's expected quality given that she wins the debate, and 
𝑞|𝑙𝑚 is her expected quality given that she loses.11 It follows that: 
(5) 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 
= 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼)𝐺((𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼) + (1 − 𝜃(𝑞
∗, 𝑞𝐼))𝐺((𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼) 
and 
(6) 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 
=
(∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)
∞
𝑞=0
𝑑𝑞)𝐺((𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼) +
(∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1 − 𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼))𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
)𝐺((𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼). 
We now present a technical lemma that will be useful in the remainder 
of the analysis. 
                                                          
11
 Note that 𝑞|𝑤𝑚 =
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼)𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
 and 𝑞|𝑙𝑚 =
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
. For detailed calculations, 
see equations (7)-(10) in the appendix.  
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Lemma 1  
(i) 𝑞|𝑤𝑚 > 𝑞 > 𝑞|𝑙𝑚 and therefore, 𝐸[𝐺|0]|𝐷𝑚 < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼), and 
𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) for a sufficiently large 𝑞
∗. 
(ii) 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 < (>)𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) when G is concave (convex) over the 
interval [(𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼 , (𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼].12 
All proofs appear in the appendix. We now proceed to analyze the 
equilibrium of the original game. 
3.2 Equilibrium 
Notice that the voter and the incumbent share the same information set and 
therefore the incumbent's announcement cannot reveal information to the 
voter. Regarding the contender's announcement, if the incumbent announces 
P, then the contender's announcement is decisive (i.e., her announcement 
determined whether or not a debate would be held) and therefore it may 
reveal information to the voter, since it is made given a specific q* that is 
privately known to the contender. Otherwise (i.e. in the case that the 
incumbent announces NP), the announcement made by the contender is not 
decisive and therefore does not reveal information. We can therefore state 
that: 
Fact 1 Given that the incumbent announces NP, the distribution of q remains p and 
therefore 𝑞|𝐼𝑁𝑃 = 𝑞|𝐼𝐶𝑁𝑃 = 𝑞. 
 Furthermore, we can state the following lemma:  
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  See the discussion of the interval [(𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼 , (𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼] following Proposition 1. 
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Lemma 2 If the incumbent announces P, then so does the contender. 
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that, given that the incumbent announces P, 
an announcement of NP by the contender implies that her quality is lower 
than in the case that she announced P and therefore the contender always 
responds to P by announcing P. 
Note that Fact 1 together with Lemma 2 implies that, in all possible 
equilibria, after announcements are made, the distribution of q remains p and 
therefore the candidates’ announcements are completely uninformative.  
We are now in a position to characterize the game’s equilibria. 
Proposition 1 The unique Bayesian equilibrium of the presidential debate game is as 
follows: 
(i) A debate is held when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼).  
(ii) A debate is not held when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼).13  
Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium outcome is independent of the 
contender's quality (i.e., q*) and at the same time coincides with the 
incumbent's preferences. The contender always announces P, and the choice 
of the incumbent, who makes the announcement that maximizes her expected 
winning probability in the elections, is therefore always decisive.  
Note that the effect of the incumbent's quality on the equilibrium 
outcome depends on the probability distribution of ε. In particular, in the case 
                                                          
13  Specifically, the incumbent announces NP and the contender announces P. 
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that ε has a unimodal probability distribution, G is convex up to a certain 
point on the X-axis, after which it becomes concave. Therefore, since the 
interval [(𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼 , (𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼] "moves right" on the X-axis when qi 
decreases, by Lemma 1ii a decrease in the incumbent's quality can induce her 
to participate in the debate. For example, when ε has a normal distribution 
and 𝑞𝐼  goes to zero, this interval sits on the positive side of the X-axis where G 
is concave and therefore the incumbent announces P. It follows that an 
incumbent with high quality prefers to avoid a risky debate, while a low-
quality incumbent may take her chances and participate. In the 2015 elections 
held in Israel, for instance, Prime Minister “Bibi” Netanyahu, who was clearly 
the favorite and eventually won the election, refused to participate in a debate 
against the contenders (although eventually a debate was held between most 
of the contenders but without Netanyahu). In fact, Netanyahu participated in 
only one debate against one of the other leading candidates, which was prior 
to the 1996 elections in which he was first elected Prime Minister, and never 
again agreed to participate in a debate.14   
Table 1 summarizes the expected winning probabilities of the 
incumbent and the contender, given the information available to them: 
 
 
                                                          
14
An exception is the 1999 elections. Prior to those elections, Netanyahu participated in a 
debate against "Itzik" Mordechai. However, the main contender, Ehud Barak, did not 
participate in that debate (but nonetheless won the election). 
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Table 1 
Incumbent/ Contender announce P  announce NP 
announce P 1 − 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚, 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 1-𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼), 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) 
announce NP 1 − 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼), 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) 1 − 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼), 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) 
Each cell in the matrix contains the pair: 1 − 𝐸𝐺 and 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗].15  
In the following section, we derive sufficient conditions under which a 
debate is either informative or noisy. 
3.3 Information analysis   
Formally, we define a debate as informative (noisy) when |𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 − 𝐺(𝑞∗ −
𝑞𝐼)| < (>)|𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) − 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼)|. Loosely speaking, if, in the case that a 
debate is held, a candidate's expected probability of winning the elections is 
the best available predictor of the corresponding probability in the case that q* 
is commonly known, then the debate is considered to be informative. 
Otherwise, it is noisy.16  
In Lemma 3, we derive sufficient conditions under which a debate is 
either informative or noisy.  
Lemma 3  
(i) A debate is informative when q* is sufficiently far away from 𝑞.  
                                                          
15 Note that by Lemma 2 and the proof of Proposition 1, 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) < 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗]|𝐷𝑚  and 
𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃 < 𝑞. The explicit form of 𝐸[𝐺|𝐷𝑚] appears in the appendix in (12).  
16
 Note that this definition takes into account only the expected value of the probability of 
winning and is not sensitive to its variance.  
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(ii) A debate is noisy when q* is in the neighborhood of 𝑞, where 𝑞 is 
sufficiently small or large.  
Given that q* is unobservable, Lemma 3 implies that whether a debate is 
expected to be informative or noisy depends on the shape of the (commonly 
known) probability distribution of the contender's quality. In particular, a 
debate is expected to be informative when choosing the contender may look 
like a risky gamble, since it is most likely that she is either a weak candidate 
or a strong one. Alternatively, a debate is expected to be noisy when it is 
likely that the contender is a weak candidate (or a strong one).  
4. Endogenous sequence of announcements    
In this section, we allow for the sequence of announcements to be 
endogenously determined. In particular, the candidates first agree on the 
order of the announcements, and then each candidate makes her 
announcement in the agreed-upon order. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2 In the Presidential debate game in which the sequence of 
announcements is endogenously determined: 
(i) Any sequence of announcements satisfies Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 
(ii) In equilibrium, the candidates' announcements are the same as in 
Proposition 1.17 
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 Note that there are multiple pairs of announcements that satisfy a Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium when a debate is not held. In particular, any pair of announcements except (P,P) 
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Proposition 2 implies that the candidates’ expected probability of winning the 
election, the information available on Election Day and whether or not a 
debate will be held are all independent of the sequence of the announcements. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: The preferences of the 
incumbent are commonly known, and therefore the contender’s action is 
decisive even when she makes the first announcement, which implies that she 
cannot avoid a debate without being considered to be a weak candidate.  
5. Conclusion 
We consider a model of presidential debates with private information, which 
may be applicable in other contexts in which two individuals with conflicting 
interests decide whether to participate in some type of competition, taking 
into account that both the competition itself and their choice of whether to 
participate may reveal information about their abilities to a decision maker. 
The results shed light on these situations, and in particular on the mutual 
effects between voters and candidates in presidential debates, by showing 
that the choice of whether to participate in a debate is uninformative.    
Appendix: 
Proof of Lemma 1i: Given that the debate is mandatory, by the base rule: 
(7) 𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑤𝑚 =
𝑝(𝑞′)𝜃(𝑞′, 𝑞𝐼)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)
∞
𝑞=0
𝑑𝑞
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
satisfies a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium when the contender makes the first announcement, 
and both pairs of announcements (NP,NP) and (NP,P) satisfy a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
when the incumbent makes the first announcement. 
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and 
(8) 𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑙𝑚 =
𝑝(𝑞′)(1−𝜃(𝑞′,𝑞𝐼))
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
 ∀𝑞′ ∈ [0,∞).   
Therefore: 
(9) 𝑞|𝑤𝑚 = ∫ (𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤𝑚)𝑞𝑑𝑞 =
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
 
and 
(10) 𝑞|𝑙𝑚 = ∫ (𝑝(𝑞)|𝑙𝑚)𝑞𝑑𝑞 =
∞
𝑞′=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑞(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
. 
By (7) and (8), 
(11) 𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑤𝑚 > 𝑝(𝑞
′) 
↔ 
         𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑙𝑚 < 𝑝(𝑞
′) 
↔ 
         𝜃(𝑞′, 𝑞𝐼) > ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃
∞
𝑞=0
(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞.  
Given that by (1), 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼) is concave in q*, 𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼) > ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃
∞
𝑞=0
(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞(> 0). 
Therefore, since 𝜃(𝑞∗, 𝑞𝐼) is monotonically increasing in q*, and by (1), 
𝜃(0, 𝑞𝐼) = 0, there exist ?̂? ∈ (0, 𝑞) by the Intermediate Value Theorem, such 
that 𝑞′
>
<
?̂? ↔ 𝜃(𝑞′, 𝑞𝐼)
>
<
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃
∞
𝑞=0
(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞. Considering (11), it follows that 
𝑞′
>
<
?̂? ↔ 𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑤𝑚
>
<
𝑝(𝑞′)
>
<
𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑙𝑚, which implies that:18 
                                                          
18
 Note that since ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞 = ∫ (𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤𝑚)
∞
𝑞=0
𝑑𝑞 = ∫ (𝑝(𝑞)|𝑙𝑚)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
= 1
∞
𝑞=0
, for each q smaller 
than ?̂?, the decrease in 𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤𝑚 with respect to 𝑝(𝑞) must be fully compensated for by an 
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(12) 𝑞|𝑤𝑚 > 𝑞 > 𝑞|𝑙𝑚.  
By (1), (5) and (12), 𝐸[𝐺|0]|𝐷𝑚 = 𝐺((𝑞|𝑙) − 𝑞𝐼) < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼), and when 𝑞
∗ → ∞, 
𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 → 𝐺((𝑞|𝑤) − 𝑞𝐼) > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼).  
Proof of Lemma 1ii: Substituting (9) and (10) into (6) results in, 
(13) 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 
= ( ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞)
∞
𝑞=0
𝐺(
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
− 𝑞𝐼) + 
(∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1 − 𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼))𝑑𝑞)
∞
𝑞=0
𝐺(
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1−𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼))
∞
𝑞=0 𝑑𝑞
− 𝑞𝐼),  
where by definition, 
(14) 𝐺 (( ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞)(
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
− 𝑞𝐼)
+ ( ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)(1 − 𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼))𝑑𝑞)(
∫ 𝑝(𝑞) (1 − 𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)) 𝑞𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
∫ 𝑝(𝑞) (1 − 𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼))
∞
𝑞=0
𝑑𝑞
− 𝑞𝐼)
∞
𝑞=0
) 
= 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼).  
Therefore, 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 > (<)𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) when G is convex (concave) over the 
interval [(𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼 , (𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼]. QED 
                                                                                                                                                                      
increase in 𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤𝑚 with respect to 𝑝(𝑞) for at least one value of q greater than ?̂?. A similar 
argument applies to 𝑝(𝑞)|𝑙𝑚. Therefore, 
∫ (𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤𝑚)
∞
𝑞=0
𝑞𝑑𝑞 > ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)
∞
𝑞=0
𝑞𝑑𝑞 > ∫ (𝑝(𝑞)|𝑙𝑚)
∞
𝑞=0
𝑞𝑑𝑞. 
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Proof of Lemma 2: By definition, 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼)(∈ (0,1)) is independent in 
q*, where by (1) and (2), 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 is monotonically increasing in q*.19 
Specifically, since 𝑞∗ ∈ [0,∞), 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 ∈ [𝐺((𝑞|𝑙) − 𝑞𝐼), 𝐺((𝑞|𝑤) − 𝑞𝐼)) (⊂
[0,1]). Therefore, if there exists a threshold level 𝑞′ ∈ [0,∞) that solves 
𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) = 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
′]|𝐷, then 𝑞∗
>
<
𝑞′ ↔ 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 
>
<
𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼).   
However, it can be shown by contradiction that q' does not exist: 
Assume for now that there exists 𝑞′ ∈ [0,∞). Since it is commonly known that, 
given the incumbent’s announcement of P, the contender announces P iff 
𝑞∗ ∈ [𝑞′,∞), 20 both  𝑞|𝑤 and  𝑞|𝑙 must be greater than 𝑞′ and 𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃 must be 
smaller than q’, and therefore  𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺(𝑞′ − 𝑞𝐼) and 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) ≤
𝐺(𝑞′ − 𝑞𝐼), which implies that 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) for all  𝑞
∗ ∈ (0, ∞) 
including q', a contradiction.  
Given that q' does not exist and 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 is monotonically increasing 
in q*, either 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺((𝑞|𝑐𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) for all q* or 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗]|𝐷 < 𝐺((𝑞|𝑐𝑁𝑃) −
𝑞𝐼) for all q*.  In the following, we show that there exists q'' such that 
𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺((𝑞|𝑐𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) for all 𝑞
∗ ≥ 𝑞′′ and therefore it must be that 
𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) for all 𝑞
∗ ∈ [0,∞).  
If both candidates announce P, then it is commonly known that there 
exists 𝑞 ≥ 0 for which 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼),  and given that 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗]|𝐷 
                                                          
19
  To see this, assume that the incumbent announces P. If the contender announces NP, then 
𝑞|𝑐𝑁𝑃 and therefore also 𝐺((𝑞|𝑐𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) are both uniquely determined regardless of q*, while 
if the contender announces P, then 𝑞|𝑤 and 𝑞|𝑙 are both uniquely determined and therefore 
given (1) and (2), 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷  is increasing in q*.  
20
  More precisely, the contender is indifferent between P and NP when q*=q’. 
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is monotonically increasing in 𝑞∗ while 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) is independent in q*, it 
is commonly known that 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 > 𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) for all 𝑞
∗ ≥ 𝑞. In the 
following, we show that, 𝑞|𝑤 > 𝑞 > ?̅?|𝑐𝑁𝑃 for any 𝑞 ≥ 0, and therefore, given 
that G is monotonically increasing in  ?̅?𝑒, 𝐺((𝑞|𝑤) − 𝑞𝐼) > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) ≥
𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) and given that by (1) and (2), when 𝑞
∗ → ∞, 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 →
𝐺((𝑞|𝑤) − 𝑞𝐼), there exists a sufficiently large q'' above which 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗]|𝐷 >
𝐺((𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃) − 𝑞𝐼) for all 𝑞
∗ ≥ 𝑞′′. 
Note that if 𝑞 = 0, then 𝑞|𝑤 = 𝑞|𝑤𝑚, where by (12), 𝑞|𝑤𝑚 > 𝑞. In the 
case that both candidates announce P and 𝑞 > 0, the probability that the 
contender's quality is q' before a debate is held is 
𝑝(𝑞′)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=𝑞
 for all 𝑞′ ∈ [𝑞, ∞) 
and zero for all 𝑞′ ∈ [0, 𝑞), which implies that 𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑤 =
𝑝(𝑞′)𝜃(𝑞′,𝑞𝐼)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=𝑞
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=𝑞
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)
∞
𝑞=𝑞 𝑑𝑞
=
𝑝(𝑞′)𝜃(𝑞′,𝑞𝐼)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=𝑞
 for all 𝑞′ ∈ [𝑞, ∞) and 𝑝(𝑞′)|𝑤 = 0 for all 𝑞′ ∈ [0, 𝑞). Therefore, 
since by definition, ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=𝑞
≤ ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞, 𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
, 
𝑝(𝑞′)𝜃(𝑞′,𝑞𝐼)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=𝑞
≥
𝑝(𝑞′)𝜃(𝑞′,𝑞𝐼)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝜃(𝑞,𝑞𝐼)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
, which by (8) implies that  
𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤 ≥ 𝑝(𝑞)|𝑤𝑚 for all 𝑞 ∈ [𝑞, ∞). Therefore, if 𝑞 ∈ (0, ∞), then ?̅?|𝑤 >
?̅?|𝑤𝑚(> 𝑞).  
Furthermore, since 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷 is monotonically increasing in 𝑞∗, if only 
the contender announces NP, then q is in [0, ?̃?], where ?̃? < ∞. In particular, 
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the probability that the contender's quality is q' is then 
𝑝(𝑞′)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
?̃?
𝑞=0
 for all 
𝑞′ ∈ [0, ?̃?] and zero for all 𝑞′ ∈ (?̃?, ∞). Since by definition, ∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
?̃?
𝑞=0
≤
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
, 
𝑝(𝑞′)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
?̃?
𝑞=0
≥
𝑝(𝑞′)
∫ 𝑝(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
∞
𝑞=0
= 𝑝(𝑞′) for all 𝑞′ ∈ [0,?̃?), which implies that 
?̅?|𝑐𝑁𝑃 < ?̅?. QED 
Proof of Proposition 1: By Lemma 2, given that the incumbent announces P, 
the contender announces P for all q*. Therefore, when the contender 
announces P, regardless of the incumbent’s announcement, the probability 
distribution of q remains p, which implies that 𝐸𝐺|𝐷 = 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚. It follows that, 
when the contender announces P, the incumbent's best response is to 
announce P when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) , and NP when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼),  in 
which case by Fact 1 the contender is indifferent between P and NP. However, 
at the end of the proof of Lemma 2 it is shown that 𝑞|𝐶𝑁𝑃 < 𝑞 and therefore the 
incumbent's best reply to the contender's announcement of NP is to announce 
P. QED 
Proof of Lemma 3i: By (1) and (2), 𝐸[𝐺|0]|𝐷𝑚 = 𝐺((𝑞|𝑙𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼) and by (8), 
𝑞|𝑙𝑚 > 0. Therefore, by Lemma 1i and given that G is monotonically increasing 
in  ?̅?𝑒, 𝐺(−𝑞𝐼) < 𝐸[𝐺|0]|𝐷𝑚 < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼).  
When 𝑞∗ → ∞, by (1) and (2)  𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 → 𝐺((𝑞|𝑤𝑚) − 𝑞𝐼), and by 
definition 𝐺(𝑞∗ − 𝑞𝐼) → 1. Considering Lemma 1i and (9), it follows that when 
𝑞∗ → ∞, 𝐺(𝑞∗ − 𝑞𝐼) > 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞
∗]|𝐷𝑚 >  𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼).  
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Therefore, since G is continuous and monotonically increasing in ?̅?𝑒, by 
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist 𝑞𝐿 ∈ (0, 𝑞) and 𝑞𝐻 ∈ (𝑞, ∞) such 
that |𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 − 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼)| > |𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) − 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼)| for all 𝑞
∗ < 𝑞𝐿 and 
𝑞∗ > 𝑞𝐻.        
Proof of Lemma 3ii: Note that |𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) − 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼)|   ≈ 0 when 𝑞
∗ ≈ 𝑞, 
Furthermore, it is shown above that 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼) when 𝑞
∗ is 
sufficiently small and  𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 < 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼) when 𝑞
∗ is sufficiently large  
and therefore in both cases | 𝐸[𝐺|𝑞∗]|𝐷𝑚 − 𝐺(𝑞
∗ − 𝑞𝐼)| > 0. QED  
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that the candidates' announcements are made 
simultaneously. Then, the existence of equilibrium is shown in Proposition 1.  
Now assume for a moment that the contender waits until the 
incumbent makes her announcement and only then responds with her own. 
Since the incumbent’s announcement remains uninformative, by definition, 
the contender’s response to the incumbent's announcement remains the same, 
which implies that EG remains the same for any pair of announcements made, 
and a debate will be held iff the incumbent announces P. Therefore, the 
contender’s announcements remain the same as in Proposition 1.21 Thus, both 
candidates are indifferent between a simultaneous game and a sequential 
game in which the incumbent is the leader.  
                                                          
21
  Note by Fact 1, the contender’s response to NP can be either NP or P. Therefore, both pairs 
of announcements (NP,NP) and (NP,P) satisfy a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium when the 
incumbent makes the first announcement and 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼). 
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Alternatively, assume for a moment that the incumbent waits until the 
contender makes her announcement and only then responds with her own. 
Then, given that the contender announces P, the incumbent announces P 
when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷 < 𝐺(𝑞|𝐼𝑁𝑃 − 𝑞𝐼), which by Fact 1 implies that 𝐸𝐺|𝐷 < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼). 
Therefore, in this case, it is commonly known that a debate is held iff the 
contender announces P and therefore by Lemma 2, she announces P for all q* 
in this case, which implies that a debate is held when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷 < 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼) and 
that 𝐸𝐺|𝐷 = 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚. Therefore, it is commonly known that the incumbent 
prefers that a debate not be held when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼), and therefore, in 
view of Fact 1, any announcement made by the contender in this case is 
followed by an announcement of NP by the incumbent, which implies that 
any pair of announcements except {P,P} satisfies the equilibrium of this 
subgame when 𝐸𝐺|𝐷𝑚 > 𝐺(𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼). Therefore, in the case that the contender’s 
announcement is followed by the incumbent’s, Proposition 1 satisfies Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium.  QED   
References 
Abramowitz, A. I., 1978. The impact of a presidential debate on voter  
rationality. American Journal of Political Science, 680-690. 
Banerjee, A., Green, D., Green, J., Pande, R., 2010. Can voters be  
primed to choose better legislators? Experimental evidence from rural 
India. Presented in the Political Economics Seminar, Stanford University. 
Banerjee, A., Kumar, S., Pande, R., Su, F., 2011. Do informed voters make  
25 
 
better choices? Experimental evidence from urban India. Unpublished 
manuscript.  
Dekel, E., Piccione, M., 2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric  
binary elections. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 34-55. 
Deltas, G., Herrera, H., Polborn, M. K., 2015. Learning and coordination in  
the presidential primary system. The Review of Economic Studies, 83(4), 
1544-1578. 
Deltas, G., Polborn, M. K., 2019. Candidate Competition and Voter  
Learning in Sequential Primary Elections: Theory and Evidence. Public 
Choice, 178, 115–151. 
Dixit, A., 1987. Strategic behavior in contests. The American Economic  
Review, 891-898. 
Erikson, R. S., Wlezien, C., 2014. The 2012 Campaign and the Timeline of  
Presidential Elections. University of Chicago Press. 
Fujiwara T, Wantchekon L., 2013. Can informed public deliberation overcome  
clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin. American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, ;5(4):241-55. 
Geer, J. G., 1988.  The effects of presidential debates on the electorate’s  
 preferences for candidates.  American Politics Quarterly, 16:486-501. 
Gentzkow, M., Kamenica, E. 2016. Competition in persuasion. The Review  
of Economic Studies, 84(1), 300-322. 
Gentzkow, M., Kamenica, E. 2017. Bayesian persuasion with multiple  
26 
 
and rich signal spaces. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 411-429. 
Gerber, A. S., Gimpel, J. G., Green, D. P., Shaw, D. R., 2011. How large and  
long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised campaign ads? 
Results from a randomized field experiment. American Political Science 
Review, 105(1), 135-150. 
Gul, F., Pesendorfer, W., 2012. The war of information. The Review of  
Economic Studies, 79(2), 707-734. 
Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., Trebbi, F., 2015. How do voters respond to  
information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. American 
Economic Review, 105(1), 322-53. 
Knight, B., Schiff, N., 2010. Momentum and social learning in presidential  
primaries. Journal of Political Economy, 118(6), 1110-1150. 
Konrad, K.A., 2009. Strategy and dynamics in contests. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford U.K 
Krähmer, D., 2007. Equilibrium learning in simple contests. Games and  
Economic Behavior, 59(1), 105-131. 
Lanoue, D. J., 1991.  The ‘Turning Point:’ viewers’ reactions to the second 1988
 presidential debate. American Politics Quarterly, 19:80-95. 
Miller, A. H., MacKuen, M., 1979. Learning about the candidates: The 1976  
 presidential debates. Public Opinion Quarterly, 43(3), 326-346. 
Noe, T., Comparing the chosen: Selection bias when selection is  
 competitive. Forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy.  
27 
 
Wantchekon, L., 2003. Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field  
 experiment in Benin. World politics, 55(3), 399-422. 
 
